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ABSTRACT
Lay participation is a conventional, but little examined, aspect of Alaska’s
administrative law tribunals. The legal community is sometimes suspicious of
lay members’ competence, leading to a trust gap between legal professionals
and their lay counterparts. With the goal of bridging this divide and shedding
light on participants’ perspective of serving on tribunals, this Article reviews
the first survey study of Alaska lay members on state adjudicatory panels.
Among other things, the survey focused on tribunals’ gender and ethnic
diversity, members’ understanding of fairness and impartiality duties, their
training, and the relationship lay participants had with administrative law
judges. As detailed within this Article, the survey’s results offer important
findings that can help the legal community understand its interaction with
lay participants. The Article also considers starting points for improving
involvement on tribunals by lay members, who altogether appear to take their
roles seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative tribunals, which often consist primarily of lay (nonlawyer) members, exercise many powers once held exclusively by
courts.1 This makes many lawyers uneasy. Historically, lawyers have
been suspicious of lay engagement in legal decision-making by juries2
and by lay judges.3 Even today, the argument that non-lawyers are
constitutionally unfit to interpret law continues to be made in Alaska

1. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From
Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 770 (1986)
(explaining that Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), “allowed non-article III
tribunals substantial powers, even in the formerly sacrosanct domain of privaterights cases”). Since Crowell, although issues have arisen over whether particular
types of rights are subject to administrative adjudication, the fundamental
acceptance of agencies engaging in judicial functions has survived. See id. at 859
(“[W]hen Congress creates an interest, short of a full-fledged, vested, old-style
property right, it has great power to use potent non-article III tribunals for
adjudication.”). See also, e.g., Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d
27, 40 (Alaska 2007) (“The constitution grants the legislature and the executive
broad power to organize administrative bodies. We have also recognized that
the legislature has constitutional power to allocate executive department
functions and duties among the different administrative bodies within state
government.”).
2. See Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases – A Study
in Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1934) (“Whatever the political,
psychological or jurisprudential values of the jury as an institution may be, its
use in the civil litigation covered by this study is certainly not impressive. The
picture seems to be that of an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively
inefficient trial device employed in cases where exploitation of the situation is
made possible by underlying rules.”). See also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
101 (1895) (“Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be
established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as
expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves.”); United
States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545) (Story, J.)
(“Every person accused as a criminal has a right to be tried according to the law
of the land, the fixed law of the land; and not by the law as a jury may
understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake,
to interpret it.”).
3. See Chester H. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15
CAL. L. REV. 118, 123 (1927) (arguing that even if lay justices of the peace were
men of intelligence and moral character, “many would hesitate to submit the
interpretation of the law and statutes to such a court”). For more recent criticism,
see, for example, Benjamin Will Bates, Exploring Justice Courts in Utah and Three
Problems Inherent in the Justice Court System, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 731, 773 (2001)
(suggesting that there is greater potential for ethical abuse and ex parte contacts
when judges are not lawyers); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People’s
Court: Rethinking the Role of Non-Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil
Cases, 29 N.M. L. REV. 119, 130–31 (1999) (arguing that having non-lawyers
adjudicate civil matters governed by substantive and procedural legal rules is
anachronistic, particularly in urban areas).
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courts.4 There is no doubt that this distrust flows both ways. Lawyers
are accustomed to facing hostility toward their profession,5 but recent
political discourse based on distrust of the legal profession illustrates
how far the gap between lay citizens and lawyers has grown.6
As decision-making bodies, jurors have been attacked as
incompetent, illogical, unable to follow the law, too independent, and
inclined to be swayed by passion or prejudice.7 However, over forty
years of research demonstrates that United States juries generally
function well as group decision-makers.8 A jury’s transience and
independence—meeting once as a body in a single case and deciding
facts without the judge present—is the foundation for claims that the
jury strengthens democracy.9 Jury service is recognized as a right that

4. See, e.g., Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 41 (explaining that
appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission,
composed of a majority of non-lawyers, could not constitutionally make
decisions that had the force of legal precedent).
5. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 389 (1987) (arguing that the special hatred of lawyers
in American popular culture derives from lawyers “embod[ying] the tension we
all experience between the desire for an embracing and common community
and the urge toward individual independence and self-assertion”).
6. Distrust of the legal profession was a recurrent theme as two
constitutional amendments directed toward lawyers’ role in government
proceeded through the 28th Alaska Legislature. Testimony presented by
proponents of H.R.J. Res. 33, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) (constitutional
amendment to increase number of members on the judicial council, a mixed
body of lawyers and non-lawyers responsible for screening and nominating
judicial applicants) and H.R.J. Res. 18, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014)
(constitutional amendment related to the attorney general office) illustrated this
widening gap. The assumption underlying the distrust is that lawyers are the
opponents of citizens, or the opponents of Alaskans, instead of being Alaska
citizens themselves, who intermeddle between citizens rather than serve their
interests.
7. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 396–97 (Alaska 1999) (“[T]he Frye
rule was intended to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence because: (1) lay
jurors can be overly impressed by science; (2) lay jurors lack the capacity to
evaluate scientific evidence critically; and (3) lay jurors are likely to give ‘junk
science’ more weight than it deserves.”). Here, the Alaska Supreme Court was
quoting State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 779 (Nebraska 1994).
8. For a concise response to the major criticisms of the civil jury based on
empirical studies, see Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 898 (1998) (“Research findings bearing
on the performance of civil juries yield little support for the extreme claims
charging juries with poor and irresponsible performance. Trial judges agree with
jury decisions most of the time and strongly support the jury system.”). See
generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007)
(providing a detailed synthesis of modern research on juries as effective
decision-makers, and concluding with a verdict strongly in favor of the
American jury).
9. See Richard O. Lempert, The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-

KNUDSEN V12 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

40

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

4/15/2014 6:00 PM

VOL. 31:1

cannot be denied on the basis of race or sex.10 Community participation
is “critical to public confidence” in the fairness of courts.11 Indeed,
several recent studies of jurors demonstrate the positive impact that jury
service has on subsequent civic engagement.12
Juries are not the only place that lawyers and lay citizens meet as
legal decision-makers. The mixed administrative tribunal represents a
singular arrangement where lawyer and lay citizen work together and
share roles, instead of performing the strictly separate roles of lay jury
and lawyer judge. Unlike juries, administrative tribunals are not
transient bodies. Their members are appointed for years, rather than the
duration of a single case. Further, tribunals generally are not meant to be
representative of large communities,13 like juries are. Rather, tribunal
members are meant to represent a small community within a particular
field,14 and they are expected to learn the law of their tribunal and to
develop its interpretation. Most importantly, tribunal members only
have the power of independent deliberation when they are constituted
as reviewing bodies. Most administrative tribunals are mixed; they share
deliberation with a professional administrative law judge, who may be a
voting member, an advisor, or a presenter of information.
The deliberative power of the tribunal is often shared with a
professional administrative law judge (ALJ), who can be a voting
member, an advisor, or a presenter of information. Professional, lawtrained judges have “status, training, skill, and experience on their side,”
and therefore, in these mixed courts, they may disproportionately
influence the tribunal’s decision-making.15 Thus, mixed tribunals are

Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 481 (2007)
(“Jury systems, once in place, support democratic forms of government, because
they are uncongenial to authoritarian rule.”).
10. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986); JEB v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
11. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
12. JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 174–75 tbl.9.1 (2010).
13. Exceptions are those statewide boards or commissions that require
appointment based solely on geographic or population distribution, such as the
Local Boundary Commission, ALASKA STAT. § 44.33.810 (2012).
14. See, e.g., § 08.04.020 (requiring five members of the Board of Public
Accountancy to be certified public accountants); § 08.62.010 (requiring two
members of the Board of Marine Pilots to be licensed pilots and two to be
managers of vessels); § 08.64.010 (requiring five members of the State Medical
Board to be physicians “residing in as many separate geographical areas of the
state as possible”); § 15.13.020 (requiring the Alaska Public Offices Commission
to have two appointees from “each of the two political parties whose candidate
for governor received the highest number of votes”).
15. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and
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targets of two criticisms. First, lay tribunal members are viewed as
irrational or prejudiced because the tribunals are intransient; and
second, because lay members are not trained in the law, they might be
dominated by more “competent” law-trained judges. Lay members in
tribunals are not without their defenders, but the defense is often based
on a latent contribution to the tribunal—by representing a “lay” view,
they make the “professionals” do a better job of decision-making.16 Even
among defenders, however, the abilities of lay members are
challenged.17
This Article does not review the scope of decisional authority or
examine the decisions of any particular tribunal;18 rather, it focuses on
the implications of some of the findings of the author’s anonymous
survey research. Instead of speculating about the thinking of lay
members, or examining theories of social behavior in hypothetical
deliberations, the author asked Alaska’s lay tribunal members for their
thoughts. How representative of their community are they? Does the
statutory mandate that a professional judge must preside over
administrative hearings mean that the lay members are subservient to
the professional in deliberation? Do tribunal lay members see
themselves as equal or subordinate to the professional judge? What do
they think about their legal role and the law? What happens when they
perceive that we, members of the legal community, treat them without
respect? Without diminishing the importance of lay expertise, what do
lay members believe is needed to improve their participation in
administrative justice?

the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 547, 587 (1997)
(hypothesizing on the persuasive power of professional judges mixed with lay
judges in the American court system).
16. See, e.g., MARK DAVIES, MEDICAL SELF REGULATION: CRISIS AND CHANGE
270 (2007) (“Lay members help us look at matters from another perspective, and
make us aware of the needs and concerns of the public. . . .”).
17. See Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 914, 918–19 (W.D. Mich. 1981)
(“[W]hile in some instances, lay members of the public serve on executive
boards of hospitals, the determination of the medical competence of a physician
is peculiarly within the domain of the medical profession.”).
18. Practice before administrative agencies, agencies’ authority to make
particular legal decisions, and the political considerations in “rule-making” or
regulation have been thoroughly studied and discussed elsewhere. See generally
Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997); Richard A. Epstein & Paula M.
Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of
Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243 (2012); Yair Sagy, A Triptych of Regulators: A
New Perspective on the Administrative State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425 (2011); Mark
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002); Anthony Vitarelli, Note, Happiness
Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115 (2010).
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The first part of this Article briefly introduces the reader to mixed
tribunals and potential sources of internal conflict. The next part
describes the survey and its respondents, including the geographic
diversity of responses. Part Three of this Article describes in detail the
survey’s findings. Specifically, it addresses the distribution of women
and minority members and perceptions of diversity among members
and perceptions of tribunal fairness, findings on members’
understandings of their duties of impartiality and fairness, members’
desire for training in decision-making and respect for their role, barriers
to active participation, and the members’ understanding of their role as
adjudicators and their relationship to the professional judge. In the
conclusion, the Author presents suggestions for conduct and regulatory
changes. An appendix of charts shows the numbers and percentages of
responses to certain questions on the survey.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

Alaska’s Mixed Administrative Tribunals

The creation of administrative tribunals in the United States was
part of a move toward “expert” decision-making during the Progressive
Era.19 Soon after, however, the impact of the Great Depression resulted
in “a host of zealous lawyers and academics descend[ing] upon the
nation’s capitol with a strong belief in the inevitability and viability of
centralized economic planning” in support of new regulatory
measures.20 Members of government boards and commissions were
intended to serve as non-lawyer experts, regulating a particular industry
and enforcing rules in small but complex fields, free from partisan
political considerations.21 Now well-established as an arm of modern
government, quasi-judicial administrative agencies are even recognized
in the Alaska Constitution.22
In Alaska, as in rest of the United States, mixed administrative

19. Jerry Mitchell, Representation on Government Boards and Commissions, 57
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 160, 160–66 (1997).
20. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 30 (2d ed. 1985).
21. Id. at 31 (“[D]efenders of the administrative process sought to justify the
agencies’ combination of functions and to minimize procedural formalities and
judicial review, contending that the salvation of the economy required
administrative controls involving expert knowledge, mixed power, and
discretionary management analogous to that exercised by business leaders.”).
22. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 22 (providing that “[r]egulatory, quasijudicial, and temporary agencies may be established by law and need not be
allocated within a principal department”).
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tribunals at the state and local levels allow citizens without legal
training to bring their expertise and community experience to bear on
decisions affecting a wide variety of legal rights and claims.23 In these
tribunals, the lay members of government boards and commissions may
be joined by an ALJ in the decision-making process. When
administrative tribunals include a professional judge in deciding legal
disputes or rights, they are mixed administrative tribunals.24 Unlike
administrative adjudication that is delegated to a single ALJ and
reviewed by a single executive, mixed administrative tribunals provide
an opportunity for direct citizen participation in justice, which has
diminished in civil disputes as cases are removed from the jury’s reach
by transfer to administrative proceedings, arbitration, and courtsponsored mediation.25
Unlike the jury, whose members are drawn by lot from the
community, membership in tribunals is based on a theory of status
representation.26 Status representation states that when people are
chosen because they are members of a group, they will act as members
of the group would act. Status representatives include members
appointed from specific geographic areas, minority populations,
commercial industries, or professions. These appointments are often
23. Most government boards and commissions perform a number of
different functions. They manage public enterprises, such as schools; they
regulate industries and professions in the public good, such as utilities and
medical professions; they inform and advise on public policy, such as land
development and conservation; and, as “quasi-judicial bodies” they decide legal
disputes and rights within the scope of their statutory authority. GALE GROUP, 8
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 199–200 (2d ed. 2005). Regardless of
other functions, when they decide legal disputes between parties, or the legal
rights of parties, they are “adjudicatory administrative tribunals” or simply
“administrative tribunals.” Id. at 199.
24. The degree of formal involvement between the professional judge and
the tribunal’s lay citizen members varies. Usually the professional judge
presides over a hearing with the tribunal’s citizen members present or conducts
a hearing alone on behalf of the tribunal. In deliberation, the professional judge
may: participate in deliberation and cast an equal vote on the decision; be
present in deliberation only to advise on points of law without voting on the
decision; summarize the evidence and be present in deliberation to advise,
without voting on the decision; or summarize the evidence, present a draft
decision, be present in deliberation to advise, but not vote on the final decision.
Kristin S. Knudsen Latta, Citizen Adjudicators Lay Members of Alaska’s Mixed
Administrative Tribunals as Lay Judges in Mixed Courts: A Study of
Participation, Attitude and Recruitment 4 (Dec. 2012) (Masters Thesis,
University of Nevada), available at http://gradworks.umi.com/15/22/1522070
.html.
25. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 8, at 63 (noting trend away from jury
trials with the growth of administrative adjudication and alternative dispute
resolution).
26. See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 162.
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termed “designated seats.”27 Status representation by “public” or
“consumer” members generally does not affect the way decisions are
made.28 Instead, public and consumer appointments represent a
symbolic legitimation of the boards’ and commissions’ decisions
through public representation.29 Thus, tribunals may derive some
degree of legitimacy through being seen as representative of the larger
community, even when they are not selected randomly.
B.

The Conflicts Built Into Administrative Tribunals

As a result of financial and resource pressures, mixed
administrative tribunals tend to be a neglected part of government.
Executive agencies find it time-consuming and expensive to gather and
train unpaid part-time members for hearings. Moreover, confirmation
authorities, especially legislatures, lack adequate review time in a busy
legislative session. These problems combine to make establishing mixed
administrative tribunals especially difficult.
These problems compound to make the establishment of mixed
administrative tribunals especially difficult. Even after established,
conflicts persist between administrative agencies, lay members of
administrative tribunals that monitor, curb, or enforce agency action,
and the judiciary that reviews agency action and tribunal decisions.
Judicial review of agency action operates as a brake on administrative
discretion, but from the agency viewpoint, judicial mandates may
hinder the agency’s operations and the tribunal’s efficiency by creating
delay and requiring cumbersome procedural requirements. Conflicts
can also arise because of how the tribunal functions. First, lay citizen
participation may encourage negotiated deals and settlements rather
than independent consideration of disputes, which undermines the rule
of law.30 And second, tribunal members can compete for power within
27. Knudsen Latta, supra note 24, at 2.
28. Research examining decision patterns before and after inclusion of
“public” or “consumer” representative members showed little change associated
with the presence of these members. Saundra. K. Schneider, Influences on State
Professional Licensure Policy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 479, 483 (1987). However, some
studies suggest that consumer representation does impact licensing board rulemaking by reducing barriers to competition. See Elizabeth Graddy & Michael B.
Nichol, Public Members on Occupational Licensing Boards: Effects on Legislative
Regulatory Reforms, 55 S. ECON. J. 610, 623 (1989).
29. See Stefan Machura, Silent Lay Judges—Why Their Influence in the
Community Falls Short of Expectations, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769, 770 (2011)
(explaining that “lay participation is seen as a source of legitimacy for the courts
and the legal system”).
30. Sidney A. Shapiro, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: A
Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L. J. 89, 92–93 (1996).
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the tribunal.
Most administrative tribunals still rely on member expertise and
community experience to lend accuracy to administrative tribunal
decision-making and to represent regulated interests.31 However, this
expertise is less important after Goldberg v. Kelly32 and Mathews v.
Eldridge.33 These cases raised the ALJ to a dominant role on
administrative tribunals by elevating the importance of legal procedure
over expertise.
C.

Lack of Recorded Opinions

It would be easier to know what lay members think about law and
their role in the legal system if they all recorded written opinions like
judges do. Unfortunately, lay members leave few traces of their ideas
concerning their proper role on the tribunal or their relationship with
professional ALJs. Most members of administrative tribunals make no
individual record as decision-makers; usually, the writing of the tribunal
opinion is delegated to the professional judge or a staff lawyer. As a
result, the voice of the tribunal is the ALJ.
A recurrent argument by some judges posits that the subject matter
expertise offered by citizen members constitutes insider knowledge that
can further diminish the role of lay member expertise. “Insider
knowledge may strengthen agency performance[,] but it threatens
fundamental fairness. If relevant to a decision, this knowledge . . . must
be tested by an independent judge, not by an insider.”34 Lay expertise,
these judges claim, is not required to analyze facts and weigh them
appropriately.35 However, increased involvement by well-trained,
professional judges, as opposed to potentially biased insiders “produces
a different emphasis . . . . The quality of the work, rather than the
outcome, becomes more important.”36
Without the mantles of expertise, community experience, or
community representation, lay members are vulnerable to attacks as
unnecessary holdovers of a bygone era, unqualified to make modern
legal decisions. Professional judges and attorneys will tend to

31. Teachers and superintendents are represented on teacher licensing
boards; physicians are represented on medical boards; and regional
representatives from different areas of a state are required by other boards.
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
34. John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to
Critics, 24 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES J. 231, 238 (2004).
35. Id. at 237–38.
36. Id. at 241.
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discourage active lay member participation if they see the lay members’
contributions as a threat to fairness, or believe the lay members lack
confidence. If lay members do not participate actively, their presence on
the administrative tribunal is seen as less valuable. If lay members
perceive that their contribution is devalued, they themselves may lose
faith in the fairness and legitimacy of the tribunal. Alternatively, they
may consider their presence alone to be an adequate contribution to the
tribunal by promoting the democratic legitimacy of the tribunal’s
decisions. In response to the rising status of the professional ALJ, lay
members may have assumed the role of impartial jurors. This state of
affairs devalues lay members’ contributions to legal decision-making in
an administrative context. Therefore, members of the legal community
need to know whether lay citizen members trust the lawyer-judges who
are advising them or believe that their views are being discounted by the
professional judge. Legal practitioners need to better understand their
impact on how lay members view the law and on how they see their
duties to the tribunal.
D.

The Research and Survey

To answer these and other questions, the Author undertook the
first survey study of lay members of Alaska’s adjudicatory tribunals.37
On a practical level, the study was feasible. The population of Alaska lay
members is small, well within the capacity of a single researcher to
contact. The Governor’s Office gave permission to contact current

37. The study was inspired by the disparity between the structurally similar
United States administrative tribunals and the mixed courts of modern Europe.
In theory, lay members of European mixed courts serve similar purposes to the
jury in American courts. Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 LAW &
SOC. SCI. REV. 275, 278 (2008). On European mixed courts, lay members restrain
the arbitrary exercise of state power by the professional members of the court,
legitimate court decisions by representing the local community, and widen the
outlook of professional judges by informing them of community values. DORIS
MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF
PROFESSIONALISM xiii (1979); JOHN P. RICHERT, WEST GERMAN LAY JUDGES:
RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 9–10 (1983); Sonja Kutnjak Ivković, An
Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ Support for Mixed Tribunals, 25 L. &
POL’Y 93, 96 (2003); Stephan Machura, Interaction Between Lay Assessors and
Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 451, 465–66
(2001). Lay participation can lend legitimacy to tribunals through its
independence from royal power or the powerful state. See Ivković, supra, at 95.
The responsibilities of European lay judges have been desribed as falling into
two categorical functions—”a control function (influencing the courts) and a
legitimation function (contributing to the acceptance of court decisions and to
the trust of the public in the legal system).” Machura, supra, at 452 n.4 (emphases
omitted).
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members of administrative tribunals throughout the state. The Office of
Administrative Hearings and other boards and commissions were
supportive of the study. Resources for independent, anonymous, and
confidential collection of survey data were available through the
University of Nevada’s Center for Research Design and Analysis.
Additional support was provided by the University of Alaska
Anchorage Justice Center.
After obtaining Office of Human Research Protection approval,38 a
twelve-page survey was distributed to every member identified on the
Boards and Commissions roster as holding a lay seat on forty-five
Alaska state administrative tribunals adjudicating legal disputes as of
July 1, 2011. The survey was announced by email and paper mail on
September 22, 2011, with an access code to enter the website; paper
survey booklets were distributed October 25, 2011.
E.

Survey Response

Of the 270 members surveyed, 156 participants returned
substantially complete surveys, amounting to a 57% response rate. As
the survey included over 100 items, the response rate alone was an
indicator of the desire of lay members to be heard on these issues.
Protection of participant anonymity was a primary concern that
limited the data collected.39 The study relied on the accuracy of
participant self-reports.40

38. Because the research was conducted by University of Nevada Reno and
involved human participants, it complied with University policies on social
science research and federal law to ensure that the rights and welfare of research
participants were protected. In a survey exploring individual experience, part of
that protection is the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality. In accordance
with the consent agreement of the survey respondents, the Office of Human
Research protocols, and the grant of permission by the Governor’s Office, the
original data and booklets remain in the secure, confidential custody of the
University of Nevada Reno, but a copy of the anonymous data file will be
deposited at the Alaska Justice Survey Analysis Center at the University of
Alaska Anchorage.
39. For example, instead of asking participants to identify their tribunal, the
survey asked them to identify the general subject matter of their tribunal and the
decision-making model their tribunal used. Even together, these categories were
so general that it is impossible to identify any single participant.
40. All data reported in this Article was supplied as an anonymous, coded
electronic file to the Author by the University of Nevada Reno’s Center for
Research Design and Analysis. All statistical relationships reported in this
Article were established using IBM’s data analytics software, Statistical Program
for the Social Sciences version 20 (SPSS-20). The Alaska Law Review does not have
access to these confidential files; more information can be obtained from the
Author by request.
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Participation in the survey was broadly representative of lay
members, drawing respondents from every subject area, type of tribunal
practice, and geographical area of Alaska. Respondents’ tribunal subject
matter areas were most commonly described as individual disputes
related to work, including occupational licensing (48.1%); followed by
other conduct or activities (22.4%); public regulation, including utilities,
labor standards, and elections (21.2%); and use of public resources and
lands (8.3%).41 The results of respondents’ choices among the decisionmaking practices of their tribunals are set out in Table B in the
Appendix.42
Geographically, the respondents’ residence approximated the
distribution of Alaska’s working age population.43 Communities under
6,000 inhabitants were slightly over-represented (26.9%), while small
towns of 6,000 to 30,000 inhabitants (14.1%) and towns of up to 60,000
inhabitants (12.2%) were slightly under-represented. The Municipality
of Anchorage (42.3%) was almost equal to its share of the state’s
working age population.44
F.

Survey Respondents

Survey respondents were predominately male, white, long-time
Alaskans, well-educated, employed, and over forty-five years old. Men
outnumbered women almost two to one overall; in only one subject area
(individual disputes related to work) did men drop below 60% of the
respondents—to 58%.45 The respondents to the question about race
overwhelmingly identified themselves as white (89%), and only 7%
41. See infra Table A for the number of responses and category descriptions.
42. See infra Table B for the deliberation practice descriptions that
participants could choose.
43. Geographic distribution was based on responses to a question that first
asked if the respondent lived in the Municipality of Anchorage. If the
respondent answered “No,” the respondent was prompted to write in a
“community of residence.” Three survey respondents did not respond to the
question whether they lived in the Municipality of Anchorage (1.9 %), and four
respondents, after indicating they did not live in the Municipality of Anchorage,
did not indicate a community of residence, so percentages do not add up to 100.
See infra Table C.
44. According to the Alaska Department of Labor Research and Analysis
Division website, which publishes population data from the 2010 census, 194,901
(42%) of the 467,915 Alaskans aged 18 to 64 reside in the Municipality of
Anchorage. DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW:
2010
CENSUS
AND
2011
ESTIMATES
(2012),
available
at
http://labor.state.ak.us/research/pop/estimates/pub/1011popover.pdf
[hereinafter CENSUS].
45. See infra Table A. By comparison, in the 2010 census, women made up
47.9% of the adult population of Alaska. Id.
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identified themselves as Alaska Natives, American Indians, Native
Hawaiian, or First Nations.46 Most respondents had lived in Alaska long
enough to experience significant social or historical change.47 The
median time of residence in Alaska was thirty-five years, and fewer than
20% had lived in Alaska twenty years or less.48 Respondents were highly
educated: 58% had a master’s degree, professional licensure, or master
craftsman’s certificate or higher.49 Most respondents (73%) said they
were employed full time, or were seeking full-time employment.50
Finally, 49% of respondents were forty-six to sixty years old, 27% were
sixty-one to seventy years old, 14% were forty-five years old or younger,
and 8% were over seventy years old.51

46. In the 2010 census, those identifying themselves as wholly or partly
Alaska Native consisted of 19.5% of Alaska’s population. Id. In the survey,
respondents were invited to “check all that may apply.” Only six respondents
indicated they preferred not to say.
47. For a general overview of the social and economic change in Alaska
between 1965 and 2000, see LINDA LEASK, MARY KILLORIN & STEPHANIE MARTIN,
TRENDS IN ALASKA’S PEOPLE AND ECONOMY (2001) (explaining how Alaska’s
Native population doubled between 1970 and 2000, Alaska’s total population
rose 30% from 1980 to 1985, and has grown 76% since 1980). Respondents who
resided in Alaska more than thirty years would have experienced the economic
boom that followed the opening of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the recession that
followed the crash in oil prices between 1986 to 1989, and the Exxon Valdez oil
spill of 1989. See id.
48. See infra Table D.
49. See infra Table E. The survey inquiry on educational attainment was not
limited to academic degrees. Some tribunals require specific vocational
experience or licensure that does not require a university degree, such as
“Master Pilot.” Levels of vocational expertise were ranked alongside academic
degrees based on years of preparation and examination. As a comparison, less
than 10% of Alaskans over twenty-five years old have a master’s degree or
higher academic degree. American Community Survey: 2008-2012 5 Year Data,
ALASKA
DEP’T
OF
LABOR
&
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/cen/acsarea.cfm (select Geographic Area
“Alaska”; then follow “Next” hyperlink; select “School/Education Attainment”;
then follow “Next” hyperlink). In this sense, tribunal members are not
representative of the general Alaska population.
50. See infra Table F.
51. Some respondents declined to answer the question, so the percentages
do not equal 100. See infra Table F. While a true median cannot be calculated
from the data, it is clear that Alaska’s general population is much younger than
the respondents to this survey. Alaska’s median age is around thirty-four years
old and only 10% of the total Alaskan population is sixty-two years or older.
CENSUS, supra note 44.
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II. SURVEY FINDINGS
A.

Participation by Women and Minorities

Appointees to boards and commissions are not drawn at random
from the general population. In that sense they are not required, as a
jury is, to be selected from a pool that represents a fair “cross-section of
the community” of state citizens.52 However, tribunal appointments are
subject to the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause, despite their
discretionary nature.53 Most appointees are selected from regulated
industries54 and occupations,55 resulting in a relatively small pool of
qualified potential members.56 Further, appointments can be
burdensome, which may lead some qualified recruits to decline.
Appointed members volunteer time to prepare for and attend hearings
for little or no pay. Appointed members must also travel—85% of
52. Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 580 (Alaska 1973) (quoting
Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 898 (Alaska 1971)). In Palmer v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003), the court majority described the distinctive
qualities of administrative tribunals:
Unlike a jury, its constituent representative makeup was specified. And
as an administrative agency, it differs fundamentally from a jury: it has
repeat business and collective expertise; its members bring individual
expertise and different professional perspectives that would probably
preclude them from sitting as jurors if a jury were somehow trying
Palmer’s claim; and it even has some policy-setting capability entitling
it to deference when it uses its expertise to interpret its enabling
provisions.
Id. at 841.
53. Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 105 (1989). Cf. Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d
687, 691 (Alaska 1994) (holding three-year durational residency requirement for
candidacy for local elective office subject to “rigorous scrutiny under . . . the
equal rights clause of the state constitution”).
54. Some of the boards and commissions these appointees serve on include:
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Big Game Commercial Services Board,
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Housing Finance Corporation,
Natural Resources Conservation and Development Board, Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, Regulatory Commission of Alaska, and Workers’
Compensation Board.
55. Some of the boards and commissions these appointees serve on include:
Board of Public Accountancy, Bar Association Board of Governors, Board of
Marine Pilots, State Medical Board, and Professional Teaching Practices
Commission.
56. The pool for boards and commissions that require geographic
diversity—including the Board of Parole, ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.020(e) (2012), and
the Workers’ Compensation Board, § 23.30.005(a)—is further limited by the
uneven distribution of Alaska’s population, which is concentrated in the Third
Judicial District. ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., FACT SHEET: ALASKA
TRIAL COURT CASE FILING STATISTICS, 2005-2012 1 (2013), available at
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ajsac/2013/ajsac.13-04.trial_courts.pdf.
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respondents reported traveling by commercial or charter aircraft to
attend a hearing or meeting of their tribunal at least once in the last two
years.57
B.

Impact of a Lack of Diversity

The lack of diversity among appointed members was troubling to
some respondents.58 About 38% of respondents indicated a lack of
satisfaction with the diversity of their tribunal, but of these, 14.9%
expressed rather mild dissatisfaction, agreeing that their commission
“has some ethnic and gender diversity, but could be more diverse.”
Sixty-two percent were satisfied that their tribunal represented the
diversity of Alaska’s population, given the size of the tribunal. Of that
number, a surprising 65% were residents of communities outside the
Municipality of Anchorage. Only 51% of the Municipality of Anchorage
residents responding to the question expressed themselves as being
satisfied with the diversity of their tribunal, but 61% of those from large
towns, 76% of those from small towns, and 73% of those from rural
communities with less than 3,000 residents were satisfied. These high
satisfaction numbers occur despite the reported dominance of white
males on most tribunals, making it seem as if only a little diversity or
regional mix satisfies most members. Nonetheless, the low percentage of
Alaska Native (7%) or other minority respondents59 presents a
disturbing picture of the participation of Native or other minority
citizens in state administrative justice.
One group of respondents stood out, however, as sensitive to the
lack of diversity. Sixty participants reported they were motivated to seek
appointment by a desire to advance non-partisan goals, or to improve
the practice of a profession. This group tended to be less satisfied with
the diversity of their tribunals to a small, but statistically significant

57. Air travel problems disproportionately affected Alaska Native or
American Indian attendance at hearings or meetings, with 40% of Alaska Native
or American Indian respondents reporting that air travel problems prevented
attendance “sometimes” or “often,” but only 9.5% of white respondents
reporting that air travel problems prevented attendance as frequently.
58. See infra Table G for the number of responses to this question by
community population and gender of the respondents.
59. Only eleven respondents described themselves as Alaska Natives,
American Indian, or Native Hawaiian. Of those respondents, one person also
chose “other,” so was included in that category. Only one other respondent
chose more than one category. Among the remaining respondents, two chose
“Latino or Hispanic;” one chose Asian; one chose African American; and four
chose “other.” The majority (133) chose “white,” while only six chose “prefer not
to say.”
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degree.60 No other reason for applying for a tribunal correlated with
respondents’ dissatisfaction with their tribunals’ diversity.
It seems the method of recruitment may play a role in the lack of
diversity among appointees. Respondents were asked how they first
learned of the vacancy on their tribunal. Over 34% percent of
respondents were recruited by a fellow professional or non-partisan
interest group member, and 32.7% of respondents were recruited by a
member of the tribunal or a state employee connected to it. Only 6.4% of
respondents first saw the vacancy on the State’s Boards and
Commissions website, suggesting that very few members are “selfrecruited.” Among Alaska Native or American Indian respondents, 40%
indicated that business or family connections first suggested they apply
for a vacancy, but the total numbers of Native respondents are so small
that further research would be needed to attach any statistical
importance to them.
In addition, repeat appointments appear to be common.61 A
recognized danger of having recruitment conducted by professional
groups, interest groups, and current tribunal members is that the
tribunal may continue to reflect the status quo. A less obvious danger
was uncovered in this survey, which is that there appears to be a
statistically significant correlation between persuasion to volunteer for a
second term and a negative perception of the tribunal experience.62
The impact of current recruitment methods can also be seen in the
distribution of women on tribunals. Female respondents were slightly
more likely to report they were first recruited through a political contact
than were male respondents,63 or through a non-partisan interest or
60. The mean value of satisfaction for those who selected the motivation
“desire to advance non-partisan goals or improve practice of profession” was
lower (3.03 on a one-to-four scale) than the mean value of all those who did not
select that motivation (3.47). The format for such comparisons (Mann-Whitney U
Test) is: Md = 3.03, n = 57; Not selected, Md = 3.47, n = 91, U = 2009.00, z =
−2.654, p = .008, r = .21. Similarly, those motivated to apply for a vacancy by a
desire to improve the lot of disadvantaged Alaskans were less likely to feel their
service was important to improving life in Alaska. Selected motivation, Md =
2.92, n = 13; Not selected, Md = 3.52, n = 143, U = 554.50, z = 2.723, p = .006, r =
.21. Perhaps this group’s dissatisfaction reflects disappointment in the ability of
the tribunal to make or cause change.
61. Slightly more than half of respondents (52%) indicated they had served
more than one term on their tribunal.
62. Persuaded second-term membership was correlated with reports of less
likelihood to report ample opportunity to ask questions in deliberation and more
likelihood of reported disrespect by attorneys, tribunal staff, or other tribunal
members. A statistical correlation does not mean that the second-term members
themselves are more likely to experience negative events; the correlation was to
the frequency of events that members were willing to report.
63. Women = 22%; men = 14%. “Other” responses with text references to the
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professional group,64 but the differences were not statistically
significant. Fewer women than men have served more than one term.65
When they served a second term, women were less likely than men to
attribute their decision to persuasion by a professional/interest group or
state agency.66 Fewer women than men were offered formal training
after their appointment, but the proportional difference was not large.67
Female respondents were less likely to be required to attend hearings as
members of their tribunal.68 Finally, female respondents were markedly
underrepresented on boards and commissions whose members hear
evidence directly, suggesting that women were not as vigorously
recruited for those positions.69
C.

Impact of Women and Minorities

Does the lower number of women serving on tribunals make a
difference? Some findings in this survey suggest that it may. To a
statistically significant degree, women respondents were more likely to
endorse “willingness to compromise, ability to negotiate,” as a skill that
is very important to being a successful tribunal member.70 Not
surprisingly, there was a statistically significant negative correlation
between endorsement of the compromise-negotiate ideal and frequency
of outcome disagreement—that is, the greater the endorsement of the
ideal, the less frequently the respondent disagreed with the ALJ on the
Governor’s office were included as being recruited through a political contact.
Men were more likely to report a “political” motivation for seeking
appointment, either to serve in the appointing administration, or to gain
community recognition.
64. Women = 39%; men = 34%.
65. Of those respondents who served a second term, 67% were men and
33% were women.
66. The numbers include text responses reflecting agency pressure or
concern. Of those reporting this influence, only 1.7% were women. The numbers
are very small, so no statistical significance should be attached.
67. Among women respondents, 46% reported receiving training; among
men, 50.5% reported receiving training.
68. Of respondents who reported they attend hearings as tribunal members
(instead of reviewing decisions or proposed decisions), 77% were men, and 22%
were women.
69. When asked if they attend hearings with an ALJ to listen to evidence,
73% of those who responded affirmatively were men, and the other 27% were
women.
70. The difference in the percentage of respondents who ascribe the greatest
importance (six on a scale from one to six) to this ideal was significant (33% of
men, 66% of women). A difference persisted among those scoring it as
important, if not of highest importance: 39% of men and 28% of women chose a
rating of five; 22% of men and only 6% of women chose a rating of four. No
woman chose a rating below four.
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final outcome in the case. Women respondents also gave greater
importance to knowledge of a tribunal’s laws and regulations than did
men.71
Other findings cut against the willingness of women to
compromise. Women were no more likely than men to endorse the
importance of unanimity. Women respondents were slightly more
inclined to endorse the role of delegate (if appointed to a designated
seat, the member should consider the interest of the designated group /
profession first),72 but not to a statistically significant degree. Yet,
women endorsed the importance of “overall fairness, open-mindedness,
freedom from prejudice” as a member qualification at a higher rate than
did men.73 And, to a statistically significant degree, women were more
likely than men to endorse a “legislative-constrained” attitude toward
the law.74
Women respondents reported greater time spent preparing for
hearings. Respondents who reported preparing for hearings also tended
to report a stronger sense of equality to the ALJ, lower likelihood of
feeling their tribunal participation devalued, greater endorsement of the
power of “principled resignation” (i.e., to “resign if no one listens to
their suggestions”), and less belief that members should always follow
the advice of the ALJ.75 While these attitudes were correlated with
preparation for hearings, they were not directly correlated to gender.
Endorsement of a “precedent-regarding” view of decision-making
appeared correlated with the race of the respondent to a statistically
significant degree, with white respondents ascribing greater importance
to “follow[ing] tribunal precedent so that decisions are predictable.”76

71. Almost 65% of women scored this ideal as six on a scale of one to six;
only 46% of men did so.
72. On a scale of one (disagree completely) to six (agree completely), 20.8%
of women respondents endorsed the role statement at six compared to 10.2% of
men; 17% of women endorse the statement at five compared to 10.2% of men. At
the other end of the scale, 32.7% of men and 22.6% of women disagreed
completely.
73. About 93% of women endorsed this ideal at six (agree completely), but
only 79% of men did so.
74. The legislative-constrained attitude was reflected in this statement:
“Decisions of [a tribunal] should follow the law as the Legislature wrote it, not
as some member or the ALJ would like it to be.” X2 (df = 10, n = 155) = 26.706, p
= .003, Cramer’s V = .294.
75. There was also a strong correlation between advance preparation and
participation as measured by the number of questions asked in a hearing, n = 73,
Kendall’s tau-b = .445, p = <.001; Spearman’s rho = .501, p = <.001, but the
number of questions asked at hearing was not otherwise directly correlated with
increased participation.
76. X2 (df=15, N=147) = 34.65, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .28.
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Respondents who identified themselves as Alaska Native or American
Indian tended to disagree more strongly than white respondents with
the proposition that tribunal members were appointed for loyalty to
certain political views.77 Minority race or ethnicity was also associated
with more negative views of the importance of tribunal service to
improving life in Alaska78 and of the fairness of the outcome of the last
case decided by the respondent.79 However, Alaska Native and other
minority respondents did not express greater dissatisfaction with the
diversity of their tribunal than white respondents,80 nor did they report
lower personal influence on tribunal decisions than white respondents.81
None of the distinctions found in respondent endorsement patterns
should be considered predictive of a member’s views in any particular
case or on any legal issue. They are presented here as signs that a
member’s gender, race, or ethnicity may affect a member’s experience of
tribunal service and perception of tribunal roles.82 The survey responses
did not suggest a perception of systematic discrimination or actual
discrimination. Moreover, while a 57% response rate is high, the overall
population of Alaska lay members is low, so generalizations should be
very cautiously drawn. Based on the responses, however, current
members agree that attention should be given to broadening recruitment
of members, especially on tribunals with persistently low diversity.
D.

Duties of Fairness and Impartiality

In Keiner v. City of Anchorage,83 the Alaska Supreme Court outlined
the requirements of administrative adjudication: due notice and full
opportunity to be heard; a hearing consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial; an impartial tribunal; and a complete record of the proceedings so
that a reviewing court is able to determine that there was no substantial

77. X2 (df=15, N=133) = 25.28, p = .046, Cramer’s V = .25.
78. X2 (df=9, N=149) = 18.53, p = .029, Cramer’s V = .20.
79. X2 (df=9, N=115) = 32.428, p = <.001, Cramer’s V = .31.
80. Ninety percent of Alaska Native or American Indian respondents
agreed that their tribunal membership represents the diversity of Alaska’s
population, given the size of the tribunal; only 57% of white respondents agreed
with the statement.
81. The most frequently endorsed measure of personal influence for Alaska
Native or American Indian (30%) and white respondents (36%) was, “When
particular issues come up, I often influence the outcome.”
82. See Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Gender, Judging and Job
Satisfaction, 17 FEMINIST L. STUD. 79, 88–96 (2009) (studying the various factors
that affect work satisfaction for both male and female Australian magistrate
judges).
83. 378 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1963).
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failure to observe applicable rules of law and procedure.84 In other
words, a fair hearing before a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
administrative adjudication.85 “Not only is a biased decision-maker
constitutionally unacceptable[,] but our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”86 Due
process requires that a person have the “opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful, impartial hearing.”87 While Alaska’s Executive Branch
Ethics Act bars unethical conduct by members of boards and
commissions generally,88 the tribunal member’s duty of impartiality in
administrative hearings is embodied elsewhere in the Alaska Statutes:
The functions of hearing officers and those officers
participating in decisions shall be conducted in an impartial
manner with due regard for the rights of all parties and the
facts and the law, and consistent with the orderly and prompt
dispatch of proceedings. These officers, except to the extent
required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by
law, may not engage in interviews with, or receive evidence or
argument from, a party, directly or indirectly, except upon
opportunity for all other parties to be present.89

84. Id. at 409–10.
85. See State v. Lundberg Pac. Const. Co., 603 P.2d 889, 895 (Alaska 1979)
(citing In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 774 (Alaska 1978)).
86. Id. at 896 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
87. Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 257 P.3d 1154, 1160
(Alaska 2011) (citing Thorne v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329
(Alaska 1989).
88. The Alaska Statutes provide:
Unethical conduct is prohibited, but there is no substantial impropriety
if, as to a specific matter, a public officer’s (1) personal or financial
interest in the matter is insignificant, or of a type that is possessed
generally by the public or a large class of persons to which the public
officer belongs; or (2) action or influence would have insignificant or
conjectural effect on the matter.
ALASKA STAT. § 39.52.110(b) (2012). Section 39.52.120(b)(4) prohibits board and
commission members from taking or withholding “official action in order to
affect a matter in which the public officer has a personal or financial interest.” In
addition, title 9, section 52.020 of the Alaska Administrative Code states “[a]
public officer may not take or withhold official action on a matter if the action is
based on an improper motivation.” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 52.020 (2012).
Improper motivation is defined as “a motivation not related to the best interests
of the state, and includes giving primary consideration to a person’s (A) kinship
or relationship with a public officer; (B) financial association with a public
officer; (C) potential for conferring a future benefit on a public officer; or (D)
political affiliation.” tit. 9, § 52.990(b)(4). The term “public officers” includes
members of state boards and commissions. ALASKA STAT. § 39.52.960(21)(B).
89. § 44.62.630.
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The survey explored respondents’ thoughts about fairness and
impartiality in different contexts. First, respondents were asked to
indicate on a six-point scale how important “overall fairness, openmindedness, [and] freedom from prejudice” was to being a successful
tribunal member. All but one respondent scored this trait at five or
higher, and 84% scored it at six.90 No other ideal trait was scored higher
by so many respondents. The ideal of “impartiality, avoidance of conflict
of interest” was scored at six by 78% of respondents, at five by 18% of
respondents, and at four by 3%. Finally, the ideal of “courtesy, respect to
parties and other members” also scored very high, with 95% of members
choosing five or above. Clearly, the vast majority of respondents
endorse the ideal of lay members being fair, impartial, and respectful
toward other participants.
Another question asked respondents for their degree of
disagreement or agreement with a role statement about impartiality.
“Citizen members should be fair and impartial in deciding cases,
regardless of their personal politics or other personal views.” Of the 96%
who responded to this question, 85% agreed completely and selected
six. Another 12% of respondents agreed strongly and selected five. To
gauge how much personal responsibility the respondents accepted for
the fairness of the tribunal, the survey asked respondents if they agreed
that they were “just as important as the administrative law judge in
making fair decisions.” Here, the respondents were less enthusiastic –
only 56% agreed completely, and 27% agreed strongly that they had
equal responsibility for fair decisions.
When asked about the decisions of their board or commission,
however, members seemed to recognize that “fairness” as a substantive
outcome was not always possible. When asked if they agreed that, in the
context of tribunal decisions, “It is important to make sure the tribunal
decisions are fair to the parties and have a just outcome, on terms the
parties can accept,” only 34% of respondents agreed completely by
selecting six. Indeed, 16% of respondents disagreed with that statement.
Nonetheless, substantive justice appears to be a goal of most members.
When asked if they agreed that “making a just decision is sometimes
more important than following the strict letter of the law,” only 28% of
respondents disagreed with the statement, while 18% agreed
completely.
Finally, to test the respondents’ awareness of procedural and
substantive fairness in a concrete instance, respondents were asked two
very general questions about the last decision they made as a tribunal

90. See infra Table J for the scores on desirable traits, skills and abilities.
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member: “How fair was the outcome?” and “How just and impartial
was the hearing and decision-making process?”91 The results were not
surprising: 89% of respondents said the outcome was “very fair,” and
86% of respondents said the process was “very just and impartial.”
The survey reveals that almost all lay members responding ascribe
to an ethic of being “fair and impartial” decision-makers. A large
majority accept that they bear responsibility equal to the professional
judge with respect to the fairness of their tribunal’s decisions.
Furthermore, a large majority understands the distinction between the
fair hearing and decisional process and a fair or just outcome. Clearly,
the respondents want to be fair and impartial decision-makers.
However, as discussed in the next section, disappointingly few
appointees receive training in decision-making.
E.

Lack of Training in Decision-making

Although most respondents (74%) considered the recruitment
process successful or very successful in identifying well-qualified
appointees, very few survey respondents (5%) considered new members
well-prepared for service. Most respondents agreed that new appointees
were only “somewhat prepared” (51%) or “not at all prepared” (21%).
Yet, only 18% of all respondents received formal training in hearing
procedure or decision-making from any source. About half of all
respondents (49%) reported that they received some training in
adjudication, hearing procedure, or decision-making after their
appointment, which was usually informal training (67%). Informal
training was given by agency staff, hearing officers, or ALJs. Only 13%
of all respondents reported they had received training from outside
professionals, like the Attorney General’s Office. The Alaska Attorney
General’s Office maintains a web-based training site with specific
information on the Executive Branch Ethics Act and provides in-person
training for state boards and commissions,92 but the low number of
positive responses suggests that few boards and commissions take
advantage of this service.
When provided, training has an impact. Respondents who received
training reported overwhelmingly (97%) that training helped them “do a
better job.” Members who received training were more likely to agree

91. To avoid identification of the respondent or the decision, respondents
were not asked any information about the decision itself.
92. Executive Branch Ethics, STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW,
http://www.law.alaska.gov/doclibrary/ethics.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
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completely that it was an honor to serve on a tribunal,93 suggesting that
training enhanced their understanding of the importance of the task. In
addition, members with training more frequently considered the
hearing and decision-making process in their last hearing very fair and
impartial than did those without training.94
The provision of training had a larger impact on women’s
satisfaction with the overall tribunal experience. Among female
respondents who received training, 83% reported a “better than
expected” or “much better than expected” experience. Among women
without training, only 45% reported a “better than expected” or “much
better than expected” experience. Training was not associated with an
appreciable difference in satisfaction among men. But both men and
women with training reported a slightly higher frequency of serving a
second term. Among men, 52% of second-term respondents had training
and, among women, 56% of second-term respondents had training.
The lack of immediate formal training was especially apparent in
one question. When hearings are delegated to an ALJ, tribunal members
have the right to attend.95 The survey asked respondents if they
attended tribunal hearings with an ALJ to listen to evidence.96 If
respondents answered “no,” the survey asked if the respondent had
ever asked to attend, with responses permitted for “yes,” “no, because I

93. Mann-Whitney U tests demonstrated the statistical significance of the
difference in scores between those who received training (Md = 5.53, n = 77) and
those who did not receive training (Md = 5.22, n = 79), U = 2285.500, z = −2.466,
p = .014, r = .20.
94. Ninety percent of those with training (formal or informal) rated the
hearing and decision-making process in their last decision reached as “very just
and impartial,” while 83% of those without training rated the process as “very
just and impartial.”
95. The Alaska Statutes provide:
The agency may, with materials transmitted under (b) of this section,
request the chief administrative law judge to permit the individual,
board, or commission that will make the final decision to participate
with the assigned administrative law judge in the conduct of the
administrative hearing. The chief administrative law judge shall
determine the degree and manner of participation and may terminate
that participation at any time. However, the individual, board, or
commission that participates under this subsection may not serve as the
administrative law judge or preside during the hearing and may not
take action on behalf of the agency in the agency’s capacity as a party to
the proceedings.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.64.060(c) (2014).
96. Responses were as follows: Yes = 80; No = 66; Do not know = 9. Later in
the survey, respondents were asked if they attended hearings, without the “to
listen to evidence” qualification, because some tribunals may have hearings
largely limited to argument over documentary evidence.
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did not know I could ask to attend,” “no, although I knew I could ask to
attend,” and “not sure.” The number of participants who were unaware
of the right to ask to attend evidentiary hearings was surprisingly high:
thirty-five of the sixty-six members who stated they did not attend
hearings to listen to evidence were unaware of their right to ask to
attend.
Respondents to this survey clearly desire more training. Of
respondents who had not received training, they most frequently
requested further training in “legal issues in hearing process, decisionmaking, or logic.” Training on the history and past decisions of the
tribunal was requested by 19% of respondents; training about technical
aspects of hearings, handling unrepresented persons, preserving the
record, safety, etc., was requested by 15% of untrained respondents; and
only 5% wanted training about advances in the field of tribunal
responsibility. Comments by respondents included requests for training
on specific subjects, “background on current issues” of the tribunal,
“Legal Theory training,” “terminology used,” and “all of the above plus
training about the . . . regulation.” The survey uncovered no
disadvantage to providing members with training.97 That 50% of
respondents desired training in “legal issues in the hearing process,
decision-making, or logic” strongly implies that at least some members
felt disadvantaged because they lacked such training.
F.

Impact of Perceived Disrespect

Despite the requirement that a fair hearing be “consistent with the
essentials of a fair trial,”98 procedural rules in administrative
proceedings are meant to be less formal than court proceedings.99
Typically, administrative hearings are conducted in less formal
surroundings as well. Informality does not excuse a lack of respect by or
97. Only one commenter suggested that training was not needed, saying,
“Learning the process isn’t difficult if you listen to what is going on and ask
appropriate questions in the meeting.”
98. Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 409–10 (Alaska 1963).
99. See, e.g., § 21.06.210(c) (“Formal rules of pleading or evidence need not
be observed at a hearing.”); § 21.39.170(b) (“Nothing contained in this chapter
may require the observance at a hearing of formal rules of pleading or
evidence.”); § 23.30.135 (“In making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a
hearing the board is not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or
by technical or formal rules of procedure . . . .”); § 28.05.141(a) (“Hearings must
be informal, and technical rules of evidence do not apply.”); § 42.05.151(b)
(“Technical rules of evidence need not apply to investigations, pre-hearing
conferences, hearings, and proceedings before the commission.”); § 44.62.460
(“The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to
evidence and witnesses.”).
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for the tribunal members. The Code of Hearing Officer Conduct requires
the presiding officer to “show patience, dignity, and courtesy to all
parties, their representatives, witnesses, and others with whom the
hearing officer or administrative law judge deals in an official capacity,”
and to “require similar behavior from parties and their
representatives.”100 Results from this survey suggest that tribunals
sometimes fall short of the ideals of collegial courtesy and respect for
members.
A striking result was that only 29% of respondents to the question
indicated that they were “always” formally thanked for their service
following a hearing or deliberation. In light of the widespread adoption
by courts of statements to jurors of respectful appreciation for their
service upon discharge, such a failure to thank lay members for their
attentive service on the record suggests that tribunals do not adequately
value the members’ service or respect the individuals who serve on the
tribunals.
To examine how certain events affect perceptions of fairness,
statistical correlations between measures of satisfaction with the tribunal
and frequency of certain events experienced by respondents were
explored.101 The survey found that negative correlations between
satisfaction and negative tribunal support experiences are more
prevalent and stronger than positive correlations between satisfaction
and positive tribunal support. The most powerful negative tribunal
experiences describe public displays of disrespect:
•
•

“An attorney or witness acted like I was not even there or only
talked to the ALJ.”
“I observed staff or ALJ show disrespect or unfairness toward
proceeding parties or tribunal members.”

Another negative experience describes suppression of dissent:
•

“I did not feel like I could disagree although I wanted to
disagree about a part of the decision.”

The third group of negative experiences concern staff omissions
and poor facilities:

100. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 64.030(b)(3)(E) (2012).
101. This survey study did not look for causal relationships between citizen
member attitudes and participation or other variables. No attempt was made to
associate adjudicatory attitudes and decisional outcomes. The relationship
between frequency of tribunal events and perceptions of satisfaction measured
by ordinal scales (where participants chose a point on a scale from one to six,
indicating a degree of disagreement or agreement) was examined using
Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients, using SPSS software.
Otherwise, for nominal measures (where there was no scale) of satisfaction or
fairness, analysis was limited to a Kruskal Wallis H test, again using SPSS
software.
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“The facilities provided for hearing or deliberation were
substandard, too small, uncomfortable, or dirty.”
“A matter settled before I arrived, but no one contacted me
before I left for the proceeding.”

The common thread running through these experiences is a
perceived lack of respect. The citizen member often feels disregarded,
embarrassed by a showing of disrespect, silenced, treated poorly by
being given dirty or uncomfortable surroundings, and forgotten. When
a tribunal permits a member to be treated disrespectfully, the tribunal
communicates to that member that he or she is not fully a part of the
tribunal’s authority.
The impact of perceived disrespect was not limited to the member’s
sense of satisfaction with the tribunal experience. A line of negative
correlations was identified between frequency of experiencing public
disregard for equality of membership (“an attorney or witness acted like
I was not even there or only talked to the ALJ”) and member satisfaction
with how well the appointing process works, how well members are
prepared for service, how important service is to improving life in
Alaska, and overall satisfaction with the tribunal experience in relation
to initial expectations. These attitudes were also negatively correlated
with a lack of time to deliberate carefully or completely,102 staff failure to
contact member after settlement,103 substandard, small, uncomfortable
or dirty facilities,104 and observation of staff or ALJ disrespect toward
parties or a member.105 In short, acts of perceived disrespect, especially
public acts, resonate beyond the actual event.
G.

Suppression of the Right to Dissent

The right to express dissent from a collective decision is a key
distinction between tribunal adjudication and one-time jury service. If
lay members of a tribunal are truly adjudicators, they must be able to
express their views of the evidence and tribunal law, instead of simply
signing off on proposed decisions written by the ALJ. Practically, this
means members should be allowed to dissent to written decisions.
The survey results demonstrate what happens when there is no
right to dissent. An inability to dissent (“I did not feel like I could
disagree although I wanted to disagree about a part of the decision”)
correlated with claims of little influence in deliberation. In contrast,

102. This was a common experience, with 48% of respondents reporting it
had occurred to them, although most indicated it happened “rarely.”
103. About 22% of respondents reported this experience.
104. About 36% of respondents reported this experience.
105. Only 14.5% of respondents reported observing such actions.
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respondents who stated that they had ample opportunity to ask
questions in deliberation tended to have strong beliefs about their ability
to influence the course of deliberation. The suppression of dissent also
correlated with low assessments of procedural fairness, fewer questions
asked at the last hearing attended, and less frequency reviewing files
before a hearing.
Although the effect was small, a statistically significant correlation
existed between the view that “sometimes making a just decision is
more important than following the strict letter of the law” and the view
that “suppressing dissent is worrisome,” suggesting that members who
want to dissent on grounds that the decision is unjust are being denied
the opportunity to do so.106 A very small negative correlation nearing
significance was found between suppression of dissent and higher
endorsement of the ideal of active participation and communication
with other members.107 Those members who value discussion in
deliberation may be interrupted more frequently, or become more
sensitive to interruption, when time is inadequate for full deliberation.
Unfortunately, negative experiences resonated louder than positive
experiences. A comparison between the responses of the newest
members and those with the greatest experience revealed that the
newest members reported fewer positive experiences than older
members, but the most experienced members reported negative
experiences most frequently. While there were positive statistically
significant correlations between tribunal respect gestures and
expressions of authority or satisfaction, all were quite small in effect. For
example, the frequency with which respondents reported attorneys
standing or addressing them by title correlated with the degree of the
respondents’ perceived influence in deliberations.108
Rather than the ALJ or hearing officer presiding over tribunal
deliberations, a senior member frequently chairs the deliberating
tribunal. If the chair is domineering or disrespectful to other members,
the ALJ or hearing officer faces a difficult situation. Silence may be
viewed as tacit approval of the chair’s tactics or position. Alternatively,
speaking up may be viewed as partiality, an effort to sway members, a
violation of the duty to be courteous to all members, or a subversion of
the tribunal’s authority and decisional independence. Disrespect
adversely impacts the tribunal’s ability to function as a fully deliberative
body. Standards of conduct should be put in place to govern

106. n = 142, Kendall’s tau-b = .242, p = .001, Spearman’s rho = .28, p = .001.
107. n = 146, Kendall’s tau-b = −.149, p = .053; Spearman’s rho = −.160, p =
.054.
108. n = 110, Kendall’s tau-b = .17, p = .025; Spearman’s rho = .215, p = .024.
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adjudications in these situations. Standards that already exist should be
clarified and enforced.109 After all, protecting the integrity of the process
and decisional independence of administrative adjudicators includes
protecting the participatory rights and decisional independence of
individual members of a tribunal.
H.

Barriers to Active Participation

If diversity and active citizen participation serve to legitimate
administrative tribunals, institutional barriers such as distance, lack of
time to prepare for hearings, lack of tribunal support, or inadequate
facilities could adversely impact tribunal legitimacy. The survey
findings suggested institutional barriers do have such an impact, but in
an unexpected way.
Surprisingly, distance, as measured by the need for air travel, was
not a significant barrier to member participation. Only 28% of
respondents reported that air travel problems had prevented them from
attending a hearing or deliberation. Of those respondents, 18% indicated
it happened “rarely.”110 Considering respondents’ frequent air travel, it
is surprising that 89% rated this travel barrier as occurring rarely or
never.111 Forty-five percent of respondents reported they had been paid
per diem or travel expenses late, and 5% reported their payments were
always late. Therefore, it came as a surprise that these factors did not
contribute to dissatisfaction with the tribunal or affect participation in
the decision-making process.
109. Some standards do currently exist. For example, the Chief ALJ is
authorized to:
(3) foster open and clearly explained agency decisions and improve
public access to the process of administrative adjudication; (4)
guarantee protection of all parties’ due process rights, increase the
public parties’ perception of fairness in administrative adjudication,
and foster acceptance of final administrative decisions by the public
and affected parties; (5) protect the integrity of the process of
administrative adjudication
and
decisional
independence
of
administrative adjudicators.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.64.020(b) (2012).
110. One respondent indicated this happened “often.”
111. At the time of the survey, only 18% of respondents reported they often
or always used a video link to participate in a hearing or meeting of their
tribunal successfully from their home community. For those with this capability,
there was a strong positive correlation to overall satisfaction with the tribunal
experience in relation to initial expectations (n = 146, Kendall’s tau-b = .28, p =
<.001, Spearman’s rho = .315, p = <.001). Use of a video link was also correlated
with likelihood of expressing differing opinions on an issue in the case, a
measure of active participation (n = 103, Kendall’s tau-b = .23, p = .008;
Spearman’s rho = .26, p = .007).
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Instead, lack of time to deliberate and lack of opportunity to
contribute had the greatest impact on members. The greatest positive
correlation was between participation and opportunities for members to
contribute to tribunal decision-making. These opportunities include
ample time to ask questions during deliberation, invitations to make
suggestions to change decision wording, and the ability to ask questions
before the final decision is circulated. Each of these experiences offers
tribunal members the opportunity to contribute to the decision. Higher
participation levels were associated with more tribunal culture,
supportive staff and facilities, reduction in travel barriers, and greater
frequency of experiences that invite member contributions. Decreased
participation was repeatedly associated with lack of time to deliberate
carefully or completely, a feeling that disagreement was unwelcome,
and absence of a draft decision to review.
Some of the correlations were obvious. For example, the greater the
frequency respondents were sent files to review before a hearing or
deliberation, the more often they reviewed those files. Some correlations
were not obvious. The frequency that attorneys demonstrated respect by
standing or addressing members by title was positively correlated to the
frequency of file review and the frequency of member questions at the
member’s last hearing. A greater frequency of receiving case files in
advance was correlated with a lower perception that the hearing officer
dominated discussion in deliberation (i.e., talked more than the average
member). Frequency of failure to notify respondents of a settlement
before scheduled hearing or deliberation was negatively correlated with
frequency of reviewing files. A similar correlation was seen between not
being sent a draft to review (and only receiving a final decision to sign)
and number of questions asked at the last hearing. Conversely, those
who reported higher frequency of reviewing case files before hearings
reported the lowest frequency of not being sent a draft to review (i.e.,
they received more drafts to review). In other words, the more the
respondent was overlooked by the tribunal, the less the respondent
invested in tribunal duties.
Members preferred more opportunities to ask questions in
deliberation. Many more respondents stated they “always” had ample
opportunity to ask questions during deliberation (70%) than were
“always” invited to provide input into the written decisions (30%) or
contacted to see if they had any last minute questions (21%). This
difference is problematic because the correlation between frequency of
solicited input and participation occurs across forms of participation.
For example, being sent a draft to review (soliciting written input) was
correlated with increased frequency of questions at hearings (giving
verbal input). Asking questions strongly correlated with length of time
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spent preparing for hearings. Member contact for last minute questions
before a final decision was issued was associated with a greater sense of
influence in deliberation, which is associated with greater participation
in other measures. Member contact for last minute questions was also
associated with a greater importance accorded to member service on the
tribunal. Therefore, to increase member participation, repeated
invitations to participate in more than one way may be necessary.
I.

Lay Members’ Understanding of Their Role

There is no consensus on the appropriate role of lay members.
Some believe that professional, judge-only administrative tribunals are
most efficient and provide the best protection of the parties’ due process
rights, and that lay members serve no useful purpose that outweighs the
cost of their presence. Arguing against mixed courts, Professor Richard
Lempert states that “considerable research suggests that this is hardly a
compromise [between the judge-only court and jury-court], for
professional judges dominate decision-making in mixed tribunals to the
point that the benefits of lay fact-finding may be largely, if not entirely,
lost.”112 Setting aside the assumption that the only value lay members
bring to a tribunal is “fact-finding,” the question becomes whether the
professional judiciary dominates the tribunal’s view of the law. In other
words, do lay members of Alaska tribunals see themselves as jurorsubstitutes, with no responsibility for interpretation of the law, or do
they consider themselves full adjudicators whose responsibilities extend
beyond fact-finding? If they see themselves as more than fact-finders,
how constrained are they in acting on their understanding of the law?
To discover what lay members think their role is on a tribunal, the
survey asked respondents four sets of questions designed to elicit views
of what they believe they should do, what they want to do, and what
benefit they feel they bring to the tribunal.113 The first question set
explored latent contributory roles, in which lay members cause indirect
impact through other individuals’ responses to their presence on the
tribunal, such as forcing the professional judge to explain legal concepts

112. Lempert, supra note 9, at 484. But cf. Neil Vidmar et al., Amicus Brief,
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 387, 387–400 (2000) (providing a
general review of the social science scholarship on the capacity of juries to deal
with complex questions).
113. Charts showing the results are found in the Appendix. The survey also
contained a question set asking how much respondents agreed with positively
stated ideals (what traits, skills, or abilities a successful member should have).
The results of this question set in context of gender differences were discussed
supra Part II.A.
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or encouraging community acceptance because community members
are on the tribunal. The second set of questions asked about active
contributions to tribunal decisions—not in terms of specific decisions,
but in terms of general understanding of what the role of lay members
ought to be. The third set of questions concerned lay members’ attitudes
toward the law when making collective tribunal decisions. The last set of
questions probed the lay members’ sense of equality and the importance
of their contribution to the tribunal in relation to the ALJ. All questions
asked for responses to a statement on six-point scales of complete
disagreement (one) to complete agreement (six).
1.

Actively Protecting Alaskans’ Rights

The results show that most respondents do not see their role as
essentially passive or symbolic. The only latent contribution statement
that more than a third of respondents agreed completely with was
“Citizen members make sure tribunal decisions are in the best interests
of Alaskans, instead of being whatever government ‘experts’ want.”
This role, as a “guardian against government overreaching” was one
that 59% of respondents completely agreed that their responsibilities
included. A global monitoring function, typified by the statement that
lay members “make sure that the hearing officers/ALJs do not lose sight
of the impact of the decision on real people,” was also popularly
endorsed, with 71% agreeing strongly or completely. Respondents also
saw themselves as having a community representative function, with
59% strongly or completely agreeing that lay members are generally
more in touch with the community than hearing officers or ALJs. Those
respondents who viewed lay members as “more in touch with the
community” implicitly saw professional judges as less in touch with
community values, suggesting that these respondents see themselves as
responsible for representing the values of the community or “common
man or woman” on the tribunal.
2.

Duty to Be Independent of the Professional Judge and Respect the
Law as Written

With respect to making decisions, the importance of the monitor
function was again endorsed with minimal disagreement; 78% of
respondents completely agreed that if a member “sees something wrong
in a hearing or a decision, the member should speak up so it gets fixed”
and only one respondent disagreed to any extent. The respondents
overwhelmingly supported (85% agreed completely) the need to be “fair
and impartial in deciding cases, regardless of their personal politics or
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other personal views.” A majority (60%) disagreed that their
responsibilities included playing the role of delegate (“If appointed to a
designated seat, a [lay] member should consider the interest of their
group/profession first,”) and most respondents (69%) disclaimed that
political loyalty played a role in their decision-making. Finally, most
respondents were willing to be critical of the legal advice they were
given. Fifty-five percent of respondents disagreed that members “should
always follow the advice” of the hearing officer or ALJ when it comes to
the law, and only 13.5% of respondents agreed completely. In view of
this openness to critical review of the law, it is not surprising that there
was a less-than-whole-hearted endorsement of a purely fact-finding
role: only 38% of respondents agreed completely that the most
important part of their job is to get the facts right and decide who is
telling the truth, although only about 13% disagreed with the statement.
Lay members tended to view themselves as a repository of expert
knowledge rather than pragmatic community mediators. Only about
30% of respondents agreed completely that “sometimes the [lay]
members’ common sense is needed to find a point where a decision
accommodates competing community interests,” but far more (47%)
agreed completely that lay members have “special expertise that should
be applied when making decisions concerning their field.”
Another question set asked about attitudes toward the law by
asking respondents what they feel tribunal decisions should reflect. The
responses demonstrated independence coupled with respect for the law
as it is written by the legislature. Respondents saw little value in
unanimity; only 21% strongly or completely agreed that a unanimous
decision was important, while 35% disagreed strongly or completely.
The value of independent judgment is tempered, however, by
awareness of the constraints of law. While a majority of respondents
agreed (18% completely, 35.5% strongly, 19% mildly) that making a just
decision is sometimes more important than following the strict letter of
the law, a more robust majority (48% completely, 35% strongly, 11%
mildly) endorsed the statement that “Decisions of a board or
commission should follow the law as the Legislature wrote it, not as a
member or the ALJ would like it to be.” However, pragmatism won out
over precedence. More than 63% of respondents strongly or completely
agreed with the pragmatic view that making sure tribunal decisions are
fair, just, and acceptable to the parties is important, but only 58% of
respondents strongly or completely agreed that it is “important to
follow tribunal precedent so that decisions are predictable.”

KNUDSEN V12 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2014 6:00 PM

2014 LAY MEMBERS & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
3.

69

Important to a Fair Decision

Finally, respondents were asked questions that probed their sense
of equality with the professional judge. Not surprisingly, most
respondents (56%) completely agreed they were as important as the
professional judge in making fair decisions, and 69% completely
disagreed that their participation in decision-making was a waste of
state time and money. Most respondents (91%) agreed that tribunals are
more successful if members trust the professional judge, but a lower
majority (70%) agreed that members had the power of principled
resignation. Although a majority of respondents disagreed that they
should be given more respect than they are now, a surprisingly large
percentage (36%) agreed, indicating some dissatisfaction with how
others viewed their position.
This Article does not include a statistical analysis of respondents’
attitudes because such analyses are unlikely to benefit those who
practice before boards and commissions or who work with them. It is
too easy to fall into the trap of viewing such analyses as predictive of a
result in a particular case. Instead, the value of the information in this
research lies in the degree to which respondents demonstrate that they
think individually and independently about the law. They ascribe great
importance to their role as fact-finders, but they do not limit themselves
to that role. They are confident of their ability to understand the law and
don’t rely unquestioningly on the ALJ’s interpretation. Those who
appoint, confirm, work with, or practice before lay members of mixed
tribunals should keep their inclination to independence in mind.

CONCLUSION
The results of the survey clearly demonstrate that Alaska’s lay
members of administrative tribunals are serious, dedicated, and
engaged members of the administrative bureaucracy. Lay members
think about their roles in a “quasi-judicial” way, they accept
responsibility for fair decision-making, and they ask to be respected as
members of the tribunal. They clearly desire more training, especially in
decision-making. They are not subservient to lawyer-judges in
deliberation, but ask to be heard. If their participation is solicited, they
will respond, but the solicitation may need to be repeated across forms
of participation.
However, these results also show the extent of problems for
tribunals: lack of diversity, lack of consistent training, lack of clear
standards regarding the right of members to fully participate,
inconsistency in tribunal support for participation, and lack of a rule
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requiring board decisions to contain an announcement of dissent for
non-unanimous decisions. Allowing a culture of perceived disrespect
and distrust to develop may have serious consequences for the
substantive and procedural fairness of the tribunal. For these reasons,
amending the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act to clarify the right
of members to express dissent, to be present in deliberations, and to
participate fully in deliberation would be advisable.
Alaska’s Executive Branch Ethics Act addresses blatant conflicts of
interest, wherein members of a board or commission stand to personally
gain or lose something of value in a decision. Most adjudicatory boards
and commissions in Alaska do not suffer from structural conflict of
interest, which can occur when a board has multiple functions, such as
deciding a claim and then paying a claim from board-administered
funds.114 The combination of functions can create a bias where an
oversight or regulatory board (or in-house hearing officer) favors an
agency’s investigators or staff.115 In Alaska, few boards or commissions
are composed of full-time appointees who exercise direct, daily
oversight; this makes combination of functions arguments less
persuasive because the boards are essentially part-time and the agency
functions on a daily basis without direct oversight. In any case,
institutional dual functionality alone does not create a conflict of interest
sufficient to deprive a claimant of a fair hearing,116 although personal
participation of interested staff in decision-making does so.117
Moving to a system that divorces board members entirely from
decision-making would deprive Alaska of the advantages of lay
participation. However, there is no doubt that members, especially
chairs, would benefit from education on distinguishing the various
board functions. The practices that make a chair effective in a quasilegislative setting do not necessarily lend themselves to ensuring the
full, fair deliberation of a legal dispute. Education in differences between

114. Denmark v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
115. Stephen R. Miller & Larry T. Richardson, A Central Panel System for
Mississippi’s Administrative Law Judges: Promoting the Due Process of Law in
Administrative Hearings, 6 MISS. C. L. REV. 133, 133 (1986).
116. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (holding that a
“combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission did not
violate petitioner’s due process rights . . . [and] did not result in a biased or
partial tribunal”); In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 105 (1987) (noting that
combining investigative and adjudicative functions results in no inherent
unfairness or due process violations).
117. See In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 775 (Alaska 1978) (holding that “to assure
both the fact and appearance of impartiality in the Disciplinary Board’s
decisional function, counsel associated with either the prosecution or defense
should not be present during deliberations”).
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adjudication and executive action, including structured deliberation, is
strongly recommended to diminish the possibility of suppressing
member contributions.
Survey respondent satisfaction and estimates of the procedural
fairness of the respondent’s last decision were positively associated with
ample opportunity to ask questions during deliberation. However,
satisfaction, procedural fairness, and substantive fairness were all
negatively associated with suppression of dissent and inadequacy of
time to deliberate carefully and completely. Allowing sufficient time in
the schedule for deliberation and repeated solicitation of member
questions on points of debate could improve both member satisfaction
and perception of procedural fairness. For some boards and
commissions, this may require scheduling longer conferences, more
frequent meetings, use of video conferencing, or other procedures to
ensure that all members have a fair opportunity to participate.
The demographic data of respondents suggests that recruitment for
adjudicatory tribunals needs to be broadened. Admittedly this is a
difficult proposition, especially for designated seats. The Governor’s
Office of Boards and Commissions has made commendable efforts to
recruit through the State’s website, but the low use of the website as an
“initial contact” is disappointing. State-generated publicity is generally
limited to press announcements of appointments. Wider publication of
opportunities to serve may generate more diverse applications. The
Alaska Legislature could contribute as well by elevating the importance
of its duty to review appointments. Giving more public recognition to
current members or the adjudicatory work of tribunals, elevating the
significance of tribunal service through legislative attention, and
publicizing the existence of tribunals as opportunities to serve the State
in a “quasi-judicial” capacity may attract more candidates.
For those who practice before Alaska’s boards and commissions,
the message is clear: there is no downside to bestowing formal respect
toward lay members of administrative tribunals. Moreover, the
commitment shown by respondents to the ideal of fair and impartial
decision-making is ample reason for the bar to support structural and
training initiatives that increase participation by lay citizens appointed
to quasi-judicial boards and commissions.
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35

Public Regulation (labor relations, labor standards and
safety, employment discrimination, human rights, and public
offices and officials, elections, commercial activity, public
utilities, insurance, corporations, banks or business)

Cases about Conduct, Activity, or Rights Not Listed Above

100

22.4

21.2

8.3

48.1

% of
Participants

100

22.4

21.2

8.3

48.1

98

22

24

9

43

54

13

9

2

30

% of
Male Female
Responses

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

* Note: Four respondents did not respond to gender question.

156

13

Use of Public Resources (land and natural resources,
including oil and gas, mining, taxes, tariffs, boundaries, land
use, non-commercial hunting or fishing, or environmental
enforcement)

Total

75

# of
Responses

72

Individual Disputes Related to Work (occupational,
professional or guiding licenses, practices, or violations,
individual commercial fishing permits, benefit or monetary
claims like workers’ compensation, disability, retirement,
medical benefits or individual employment rights)

Kind of Disputes Decided by the Tribunal on which
Participant Currently Serves

TABLE A. Subject Matter of Disputes Decided by Tribunal and Gender*
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Delegated Hearing + Tribunal Review. An ALJ hears the case and writes a proposed decision.
Members of the tribunal review the proposed decision without the presence, collaboration or
advice from the ALJ The tribunal may adopt, amend, or reject the proposed decision.

156

38

Delegated Hearing + Collaborative Deliberation. The ALJ conducts a hearing for the tribunal
and prepares a draft proposed decision. Then the ALJ meets with the tribunal while members
discuss the evidence and the draft decision. The ALJ does not vote. The ALJ writes the final decision.

TOTAL

16

Delegated Hearing + Advisory Deliberation. An ALJ conducts a hearing for the tribunal.
Before a proposed decision is written, the ALJ meets with the tribunal members while
they discuss the evidence. The members make a decision. The ALJ does not vote.
Usually the ALJ writes the decision.

9

19

Shared Hearing + Advisory Deliberation. Citizen members attend the hearing with an ALJ
who presides over the hearing. During deliberation, the ALJ remains in the room to advise
the tribunal members, but does not vote. The ALJ writes the decision.

NO RESPONSE GIVEN

43

100

0

21.10

25.90

10.90

12.90

29.30

% of
# of
Responses Responses

Shared Hearing + Conference Deliberation. Citizen members and an ALJ(or qualified member)
hear the case together. They deliberate and decide the outcome together. The ALJ and citizen
members each have one vote. Usually, the ALJ writes the decision.

Choice of group that “best fits” how member’s tribunal works to decide cases

TABLE B. Reported Tribunal Decision-Making Style
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26.9

14.1

12.2

42.3

95.5

4.5

100

42

22

19

66

149

7

156

Rural

Small Town 6K or more

Town 30-60K

Municipality of Anchorage

Subtotal

No Entry or No Response

Total

—

51

25

8

9

—

96

40

11

14

31

Male

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

100

—

100

44.3

12.8

7

11

Female

74

14.8

28.2

% of Total
% of
Participants Responses

# of
Responses

Community

TABLE C. Distribution of Community Population by Gender
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4.5
16
20.5
28.8
28.8
1.3
100

7
25
32
45
45
2
156

0-10 years
11 to 20 years
21 to 30 years
31 to 40 years
41 or more years
No response
Total

100

0

29.2

29.2

20.8

16.2

4.5

% of
Responses

27

34

21

13

3

Male

54

98

4 no response

17

11

10

12

4

Female

*Years in Alaska were reported as a number, but coded into decades. The median, 35,
and the mean, 34.66, were calculated from the total number of years reported by
154 responses.

% of Total
Participants

# of
Responses

Years in Alaska*

TABLE D. Years Lived in Alaska by Decades and Gender
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75

# of
Responses
4

25

38

51

37

1

156

Level of Education Reported

Up through High School or GED
Some vocational training or college after High School
or GED
Completed formal (union) apprenticeship or BA, BS
degree
Master’s Degree, Master Craftsman, or professional
license (PE, CPA, PA-C, etc.)
Ph.D. or M.D., J.D., Ed.D., etc.

No response

Total

100

0

23.9

32.9

24.5

54

8

28

12

5

1

Female

4

98

26

23

26

20

3

Male

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

100

0.6

23.7

32.7

24.4

16.1

2.6

% of
Responses

76

16

2.6

% of Total
Participants

TABLE E: Reported Education Level of Participants by Gender
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% of Total

0.6
14.1
48.7
26.9
8.3
0.6
0.6
100%

# of
Responses
1
22
76
42
13
1
1
156

Age

18-25 years
26-45 years
46-60 years
61-70 years
Over 70 years
Prefer not to say
No response
Total

100%

8.4

27.3

49.4

14.3

0.6

% of
Responses

8
21
7

67
21
6

39

2

20

114

1

0

3

# not employed /
not seeking
employment

# employed /
seeking
employment

TABLE F: Age and Employment Status of Respondent
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Rural

2

5

4

30

41

Degree of satisfaction with diversity

Lacks both ethnic and gender diversity

Lacks either ethnic or gender diversity

Has some ethnic and gender diversity,
but could be more diverse given the size
of the board or commission

Represents the diversity of Alaska’s
population given the size of the board or
commission

Total

18

11

62

32

11

50

29

8

11

2

94

60

13

10

11

Male

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

21

16

3

1

0

2

5

3

3

Female

78

14

Municipality of
Anchorage

Town
30,00060,000

More than
6,000

TABLE G. Satisfaction with Diversity, by Community Population and Gender
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2

0

33

29

0

2

1

Delegated Hearing + Advisory
Deliberation
Delegated Hearing + Collaborative
Deliberation
Delegated Hearing + Tribunal Review

14

15

0

0

12

12

8

5

12

Female

19

25

6

14

30

Male

2014 LAY MEMBERS & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

*Not all participants answered every question; absent responses are excluded. Therefore, numbers will not
necessarily total equally.

1

0

0

4

4

34

Shared Hearing + Advisory
Deliberation

0

2

Shared Hearing + Conference
Deliberation

>1 chosen White Other

Alaska Native /
American Indian

Deliberation Form

TABLE H: Deliberation Form by Race and Gender*

KNUDSEN V12 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)
4/15/2014 6:00 PM

79

KNUDSEN V12 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

80

4/15/2014 6:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 31:1

TABLE J. Desirable Traits: How Important It Is for Lay Members to
Have _____?
1. Expertise or experience in regulated field
# of
% of
Score
% of Responses
Responses
Total
1

2

1.3

1.3

2

5

3.2

3.2

3

13

8.3

8.3

4

28

17.9

17.9

5

35

22.4

22.4

6

73

46.8

46.8

Total

156

100

100

2. Impartiality, avoidance of conflict of interest
# of
% of
Score
% of Responses
Responses
Total
Note: no response
to 2, 3

1

1

0.6

0.6

4

5

3.2

3.2

5

28

17.9

17.9

6

122

78.2

78.2

Total

156

100

100

3. Prompt, ready, and regular attendance
# of
% of
Score
Responses
Total
1
Note: no
responses to 2, 3

1

0.6

% of Responses
0.6

4

2

1.3

1.3

5

43

27.6

27.6

6

110

70.5

70.5

Total
156
100
100
4. Ability to understand and weigh the evidence
# of
% of
Score
% of Responses
Responses
Total

Note: no
responses to 2, 3

1

2

1.3

1.3

4

2

1.3

1.3

5

31

19.9

20

6

120

76.9

77.4

Total

155

99.4

100

No opinion

1

0.6

Total

156

100
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TABLE J cont’d.
5. Knowledge of the tribunal’s laws and regulations
Score

# of
Responses

% of
Total

% of Responses

1

1

0.6

0.6

2

3

1.9

1.9

3

4

2.6

2.6

4

10

6.4

6.4

5

55

35.3

35.3

6

83

53.2

53.2

Total

156

100

100

6. Active participation, communication with other members
Score

# of
Responses

% of
Total

% of Responses

1

1

0.6

0.6

2

1

0.6

0.6

3

3

1.9

1.9

4

11

7.1

7.1

5

45

28.8

28.8

6

95

60.9

60.9

Total

156

100

100

7. Willingness to stick to principles, independence

Note: no response
to 2

Score

# of
Responses

% of
Total

% of Responses

1

2

1.3

1.3

3

8

5.1

5.1

4

13

8.3

8.3

5

49

31.4

31.4

6

84

53.8

53.8

Total

156

100

100
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TABLE J cont’d.
8. Overall fairness, open-mindedness, freedom from prejudice

Note: no response
to 2, 3, 4

Score

# of
Responses

% of
Total

% of Responses

1

2

1.3

1.3

5

23

14.7

14.7

6

131

84

84

Total

156

100

100

9. Willingness to compromise, ability to negotiate

Note: no response
to 2

Score

# of
Responses

% of
Total

% of Responses

1

3

1.9

1.9

3

4

2.6

2.6

4

24

15.4

15.5

5

55

35.3

35.5

6

69

44.2

44.5

Subtotal

155

99.4

100

No opinion

1

0.6

Total

156

100
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Table 1. Endorseme
ent of Latent Contributions

How lay members contribute

Remind judg
ges of the imp
pact of
decisionss on real peop
ple

14.1

Explain triibunal to the public

19.9

Bring the common touch,
sim
mplify the proccess

19.9

Promo
ote acceptancee of
decisionss by the comm
munity

30.1

32.1

27.6

266.9

19.9

28.88

22.4

Are "morre in touch wiith the
community"

25

26.3

Guardian of the best interests of
Alaskans ag
gainst govern
nment

32.7

23.1

Represeent the interessts of a
group
0

20

24.4

59

12.8

26.9

40

660

26.3

80

100

% rresponse lesss than 100%
exclud
des no opinio
on/ no answeer
1

2

3

4

5

6
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Table
e 2. Endorsement of L
Lay Roles W
When
Mak
king Decisiions

Roles of lay members

Political deelegate: choseen for
loyalty to certain politicall views

18

222

Special expertise sho
ould be
app
plied in decisio
ons

144.7

774.4
811.4

11.55

Pragmatic mediator: com
mmon
8.3 116.7
sense need
ded to accomm
modate…
Always fo
ollow legal ad
dvice of
ALJ / hearing officcer
Get the facts right, decide who is
truthful
t

23.7

9.6 14.7

32.1

288.8

0

28.8

41.7

15.44 14.7

Delegate: consider
c
interrests of
group/
/profession fiirst

11

44.2

27.6

Monitorr: speak up if see
17..3
something wrong
w
in hearring or…
Fair and
d impartial deecisionmaker

16

21

23.7

16

36.5

17.3 144.1 12.8 12.8 13..5

20

40

60

80

100

% response leess than 100%
%
exclludes no opin
nion/ no answ
wer
1

2

3

4

5

6
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Table 3.. Endorsem
ment of Attiitudes towaard Law
Reaching
R
a unaniimous decision iss
imporrtant.

Imporrtant to follow tribunal precedent
so that decisions arre predictable.

15

18

17 4

26

222

6 10

38

19

1
2

Decissions . . . Should follow
f
the law ass
thee Legislature wrote it, not as a
memb
ber or the ALJ would
w
like it to bee.

11

Important to make sure the tribuna
al
deecisions are fair to
o the parties and
d
ha
ave a just outcom
me, on terms the
parties can
n accept.

10

Ma
aking a just decission is sometimess
mo
ore important than following thee
strict letter of
o the law.

19

335

3

447

4
5
19

8 8 11

29

19

33

35

6

17

0 10 20 300 40 50 60 700 80 90 100
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Table 4-A. Endorsement of Equal Responsibility for
Fair Decisions
strongly
completely disagree
disagree
1%
0%

disagree
5%
agree
10%

completely disagree
strongly disagree
disagree
agree
strongly agree
completely agree

completely
agree
57%

strongly
agree
27%

